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Abstract: Latent factor models for recommender systems represent users and items as low dimensional vectors. Privacy
risks of such systems have previously been studied mostly in the context of recovery of personal information
in the form of usage records from the training data. However, the user representations themselves may be used
together with external data to recover private user information such as gender and age. In this paper we show
that user vectors calculated by a common recommender system can be exploited in this way. We propose
the privacy-adversarial framework to eliminate such leakage of private information, and study the trade-off
between recommender performance and leakage both theoretically and empirically using a benchmark dataset.
An advantage of the proposed method is that it also helps guarantee fairness of results, since all implicit
knowledge of a set of attributes is scrubbed from the representations used by the model, and thus can’t enter
into the decision making. We discuss further applications of this method towards the generation of deeper and
more insightful recommendations.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of digital content
consumption, recommender systems have become a
major influencer of online behavior, from what news
we read and what movies we watch, to what products
we buy. Recommender systems have revolutionized
the way items are chosen across multiple domains,
moving users from the previous active search scenario
to the more passive selection of presented content as
we know it today.
A recommender system needs to fulfill two objec-
tives in order to be able to supply relevant recom-
mendations that will be helpful to users. Namely, it
has to accurately model both the users and the items.
An implication of the first objective is that recom-
menders aim at revealing users’ preferences, their de-
sires and wills, and even learn when to suggest differ-
ent items (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2015), and how
many times to recommend a given item. In order to
be effective, a system must have an extensive view
of a user, embodied as a representation that includes a
substantial amount of private information (which may
be either implicitly or explicitly encoded).
Indeed, in recent years we have seen a plethora
of advanced methods applied to improve the per-
sonalized recommendation problem. Furthermore,
modern Collaborative Filtering approaches are be-
coming increasingly more complex not only in al-
gorithmic terms but also in their ability to pro-
cess and use additional data. Arguably, demo-
graphic data is the most valuable source of infor-
mation for user modeling. As such, it was used
from the early days of recommendation systems
(Pazzani, 1999). New deep learning based state of
the art methods also utilize demographic information
(Covington et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2014) in order to
generate better and more relevant predictions.
While this in-depth modeling of users holds great
value, it may also pose severe privacy threats. One
major privacy concern, especially when private in-
formation is explicitly used during training, is recov-
ery of records from the training data by an attacker.
This aspect of privacy has previously been studied in
the context of recommender systems using the frame-
work of differential privacy (see Section 2 below). A
related but different threat, which to the best of our
knowledge has not yet been addressed in this context,
is the recovery of private information that was not ex-
plicitly present in the training data. In the implicit pri-
vate information attack, either the recommendations
or the user representations within a recommender sys-
tem are used together with an external information to
uncover private information about the users.
For example, an attacker with access to the gender
of some users could use their representations and a
supervised learning approach to infer the gender of
all users. In an extreme case, it would suffice for an
attacker to glance at a random individual’s computer
screen, see what content is being suggested to them by
the recommendation system, and immediately infer
many demographic, financial, and other information
pertaining to the individual.
In this paper we introduce the threat of implicit
private information leakage in recommender systems.
We show the existence of the leakage both theoret-
ically, and experimentally using a standard recom-
mender and benchmark dataset. Finally, we pro-
pose the privacy-adversarial method of constructing
a recommender from which the target private infor-
mation cannot be read out, using the adversarial train-
ing method (Ganin et al., 2016). We show the ability
of this method to conceal private information and the
trade-off between recommender performance and pri-
vate information leakage.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We describe and formalize the threat of implicit
information leakage in machine learning models
in general, and recommenders in particular.
• We suggest the privacy-adversarial method (an
adaptation of adversarial training to our setting)
to eliminate the leakage, and validate the method
in an extensive set of experiments.
• Finally, we discuss the tangential issue of fairness
in machine learning, and suggest that the privacy-
adversarial method we use in this paper for the
sake of privacy is capable of fixing some fairness
problems previously discussed in the context of
general machine learning models.
2 RELATEDWORK
Since the release of the Netflix Prize dataset
(Bennett et al., 2007), a large body of work proved
that raw historical usage of users might reveal private
information about them (e.g., (Weinsberg et al., 2012;
Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008)). That is, given his-
torical usage of an anonymized user, one can infer the
user’s demographics or even their identity. However,
we argue that even the users’ representations may re-
veal private information, without access to the train-
ing data (and in fact, the same is true about the rec-
ommendations presented to the user – i.e. the actual
recommendation, which can be intercepted or seen by
a third party, includes private information that we may
wish to conceal).
Privacy has also been studied recently
in the context of recommender systems
(Berlioz et al., 2015; Nikolaenko et al., 2013;
McSherry and Mironov, 2009; Friedman et al., 2016;
Liu et al., 2015; Shen and Jin, 2014). This growing
body of work has been concerned for the most part
with differentially private recommender systems, and
always with the aim of guaranteeing that the actual
records used to train the system are not recoverable.
Unlike these works, we are concerned with the leak-
age of private information (such as demographics:
age, gender, etc.) that was not directly present during
training, but was implicitly learned by the system in
the process of generating a useful user representation.
These two ideas are not mutually exclusive, and may
be combined to achieve a better privacy preserving
recommender.
The problem of implicit private information stud-
ied here is closely related to the one studied in
(Zemel et al., 2013). In their work, they look for rep-
resentations that achieve both group fairness and indi-
vidual fairness in classification tasks. Individual fair-
ness means that two persons having a similar repre-
sentation should be treated similarly. Group fairness
means that given a group we wish to protect (some
proper subset S ⊂ P of the population P), the pro-
portion of people positively classified in S equals that
in the entire population. They achieved this goal by
solving an optimization problem to learn an inter-
mediate representation that obfuscates the member-
ship in the protected group. In both cases the aim is
to achieve good results on the respective predictive
tasks, while using a representation that is agnostic to
some aspects of the implicit structure of the domain.
Several works apply adversarial training for the
purpose of creating a representation free of a spe-
cific attribute (Beutel et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017;
Zhang et al., 2018; Elazar and Goldberg, 2018) (in
fact, the original purpose of the method of adversarial
training can also be seen as such). To the best of our
knowledge, the current paper represents the first ap-
plication of these ideas in the domain of recommender
systems. Furthermore, while all the aforementioned
applications experiment with solely one feature at a
time, in this work we aim to create a representation
free of multiple demographic features.
3 PRIVACY AND USER
REPRESENTATIONS
User representations in recommendation systems
are designed to encode the relevant information to de-
termine user-item affinity. As such, to the extent that
item affinity is dependent on certain user character-
istics (such as demographics), the optimal user rep-
resentations must include this information as well in
order to have the necessary predictive power with re-
spect to recommendations. We formalize this intu-
ition using an information theoretic approach:
Theorem 1. Let vˆ = f (pu,qi) be an estimator of an
outcome variable v associated with a pair (pu,qi) of
user and item representations (we use p to denote
users, and q to denote items throughout the paper),
and d any variable associated with users (such as age,
gender, or marital status to name a few):
I(v; vˆ)> H[v|d] =⇒ I(vˆ;d)> 0
Proof.
H[v] = H[v|d]+ I(v;d) = H[v|vˆ]+ I(v; vˆ)
rearranging and using I(v; vˆ)> H[v|d] we have:
I(v;d)> H[v|vˆ]
and therefore:
I(v;d)+ I(v; vˆ)> H[v|vˆ]+H[v]−H[v|vˆ] = H[v]
=⇒ I(vˆ;d)> 0
To see how the final step follows, suppose on the con-
trary:
I(vˆ;d) = 0
then from the above and by the chain rule for infor-
mation we have:
H[v]< I(v;d)+ I(v; vˆ) = I(v;d)+ I(v; vˆ|d) = I(v;d, vˆ)
in contradiction to the H[x] ≥ I(x; ·) relation of en-
tropy and mutual information.
Theorem 1 asserts that the predictions vˆmust con-
tain information about any relevant variable associ-
ated with users, if they are better than a certain thresh-
old determined by the relevance of the variable. For
example, if age is a strong determinant of the movies
a user is likely to want to watch, then by looking at
the recommendations for a user we will be a able to
extract some information about said user’s age. Next,
we show that the same is true about the user repre-
sentations used by the recommender, once the item
representations are fixed (i.e. after learning):
Theorem 2. Let vˆ= f (pu,qi) = g(pu) be an estima-
tor of outcome variable v, and d a variable associated
with users, then: I(pu;d)≥ I(vˆ;d)
Proof. vˆ is a function of pu alone and so by the data
processing inequality we have ∀d : I(pu;d) ≥ I(vˆ;d).
Corollary 1. As a result of Theorems 1 - 2, for any
meaningful recommendation system and user charac-
teristic there will be information leakage between the
user representation and the characteristic. Specifi-
cally, for any system vˆ = f (pu,qi), and user charac-
teristic d we have that:
I(pu;d)≥ I(vˆ;d)> 0
This assertion, that we cannot have both per-
fect privacy and performance in our setting, naturally
leads to the question of the trade-off between the ex-
tent of information leakage, and the performance of
the recommendation system. While the precise point
selected on this trade-off curve is likely to be deter-
mined by the use-case, it would be reasonable to as-
sume that in any case we will not want to sacrifice
privacy unless we gain in performance. This can be
understood as a Pareto optimality requirement on the
multi-objective defined by the system and privacy ob-
jectives:
Definition 1. The privacy acceptable subset of a fam-
ily S of recommendation systems of the form: f :
[nusers]× [nitems]→ R+ with respect to a recommen-
dation loss l and a privacy target h is the Pareto front
in S of the multi-objective (l,h).
While the method described in the rest of this
paper does not directly address the issue of select-
ing a privacy-acceptable system, we show that our
method is able to dramatically reduce information
leakage while maintaining the majority of system per-
formance. Future work will focus on methods and an-
alytical tools in the spirit of Theorem 1 to assert that
for a given system with a certain performance, there
does not exist a system (in the family under consider-
ation) with at least equal performance and better pri-
vacy.
3.1 Privacy-Adversarial
Recommendation Systems
In the previous section we showed that for any rec-
ommendation system where the user representations
capture enough to make good predictions, these rep-
resentations must reveal information about any perti-
nent user characteristic. In this section we describe a
method to reduce such information from the user rep-
resentations, in a way that allows to select along the
trade-off curve of performance and information leak-
age.
The method we use borrows the key idea from
domain-adversarial training (Ganin et al., 2016),
where the aim is to learn a representation that is
agnostic to the domain from which the example is
drawn. Adapted to the problem at hand, this method
enables us to construct a user representation from
which the private information can not be read out.
We start with an arbitrary latent factor recommen-
dation system (which we will assume is trained using
a gradient method). An additional construct is then
appended from the user vectors, the output of which
is the private field(s) we wish to censor. During train-
ing we follow two goals: (a) we would like to change
the recommender parameters to optimize the original
system objective, and (b) we would like to change
the user vectors only, in order to harm the readout
of the private information, while optimizing the read-
out parameters themselves with respect to the private
information readout target. This is achieved by ap-
plication of the gradient reversal trick introduced in
(Ganin et al., 2016), leading to the following update
rule for user representation pu:
pu← pu−α
[∂lossrecsys
∂pu
−λ∑
i
∂lossdemographicsi
∂pu
]
(1)
where α and λ are the general learning rate, and
the adversarial training learning rate respectively.
lossrecsys is the recommendation system loss, and
lossdemographicsi is the loss for the i− th demographic
field prediction task.
Two special cases are noteworthy. First, for λ = 0
this formulation reduces back to the regular recom-
mendation system. Second, setting λ < 0 we get the
multi-task setting where we are trying to achieve both
the recommendation and the demographic prediction
task simultaneously.
The gradient descent update for the rest of the rec-
ommendation system parameters (namely, the item
representations and biases) is done by the regular
−α
∂lossrecsys
∂θ
update rule. Likewise, the parameters for
the demographic field readouts are optimized in the
same way with respect to their respective classifica-
tion objectives.
4 A NOTE ABOUT FAIRNESS
The issue of fairness of models is a long stand-
ing debate in the scientific community and beyond.
Some cases aspects of fairness are mandated by legis-
lation or social norms. For instance, when modeling
risk for the purpose of loans, in most countries the
use of certain characteristics (such as gender or race)
would be strictly prohibited. However, while these
protected variables are not explicitly entered into the
model, how can we be sure that they did not affect the
outcome via correlations with variables which were
indeed included?
Many methods have been devised to address this
question and guarantee fairness (see Section 2 for a
brief summary of some of these lines of work). The
ultimate solution to the problem of fairness is to be
able to guarantee that a set of variables did not have
an affect on the outcome of a model. In order to be
able to give such a guarantee we should be able to
assert that the information content of the forbidden
variables was not present in the model.
It is easy to see why just excluding protected vari-
ables from the model is not enough. Suppose for in-
stance we wish to exclude gender from our model in
order to have equality in the outcome of the model
with respect to this attribute. Namely, we want the
distributions of outcomes to be the same for all gen-
ders. The first step is to exclude this variable from
the model. However, including other seemingly be-
nign attributes such as occupation will allow gender
to be implicitly included in the model (since presum-
ably these variables are dependent, i.e. share infor-
mation that will allow the model to ’guess’ the gender
anyway).
The method of privacy-adversarial training of rec-
ommender systems presented in this paper is a step
towards fairness in machine learning models. By ap-
plying privacy-adversarial training with respect to a
set of protected attributes, we ensure that the repre-
sentation of the individual does not include these at-
tributes, and they therefore can’t affect the outcome.
However, we note that the method does not come with
a provable guarantee that this information was indeed
scrubbed from the model. Furthermore, in a recent
study (Elazar and Goldberg, 2018) it has been shown
that a similar technique is able to eliminate demo-
graphic classification during training in an NLP task,
but the text representations produced by the model
still contain demographic information that can be ex-
tracted via different classifiers. In the next section we
provide evidence that at least in the context of recom-
mendation systems the method of privacy-adversarial
training works well, and that the resulting represen-
tations do not contain information about gender and
age that can be read out even by additional classifier
(Table 1). That being said, it is important to remem-
ber that for critical issues such as privacy and fairness
we would ideally want provability of the properties of
the method.
5 RESULTS
Data The experiments in this section were
conducted on the MovieLens 1M dataset
(Harper and Konstan, 2016). This extensively
studied dataset (see for example (Miller et al., 2003;
Chen et al., 2010; Jung, 2012; Peralta, 2007)) in-
cludes 1,000,209 ratings from 6,040 users, on 3,706
movies. In addition, demographic information in the
form of age and gender is provided for each user.
Gender (male/female) is skewed towards male with
71.7% in the male category. Age is divided into 7
groups (0-18, 18-25, 25-35, 35-45, 45-50, 50-56,
56-inf) with 34.7% in the most popular age group,
being 25-35. This means that when absolutely no
personal data is given about an arbitrary user, the
prediction accuracy of gender and age group cannot
exceed 71.7% and 34.7% respectively.
Recommendation System We use the Bayesian
Personalized Ranking (BPR) recommendation sys-
tem (Rendle et al., 2009), a natural choice for rank-
ing tasks. The model is modified with adver-
sarial demographic prediction by appending a lin-
ear readout structure from the user-vectors to each
of the demographic targets (binary gender and 7-
category age). The gradient reversal layer (GRL)
(Ganin et al., 2016) is applied between the user-
vectors and each of the demographic readout struc-
tures, so that effectively during training the user vec-
tors are optimized with respect to the recommenda-
tion task, but de-optimized with respect to the gender
prediction. At the same time, the demographic read-
out is optimized to use the current user representation
to predict gender and age. The result of this scheme
is a user representation that is good for recommenda-
tion but not good for demographic prediction (i.e. is
purged of the information we do not want it to con-
tain). We note that the same method could be ap-
plied to any type of recommendation system which
includes user representations and is trained using a
gradient based method.
Evaluation Recommendation systems were evalu-
ated using a hold out set. For each user in the
MovieLens 1M Dataset, the final movie that they
watched was set aside for testing, and never seen dur-
ing training. The fraction of users for whom this
held out movie was in the top-k recommendation
(Koren, 2008) is reported as model accuracy (we use
Table 1: Verification of the inability to predict demographic
fields from user representations trained in the privacy-
adversarial method. Results in this table are given for rep-
resentations of size 10 with λ = 1.
classifier gender age
large class baseline 71.70 34.70
softmax neural net readout 71.70 34.47
SVM (linear; C=.1) 71.71 34.62
SVM (linear; C=1) 71.71 34.59
SVM (linear; C=10) 71.71 34.59
SVM (RBF kernel) 71.71 29.20
Decision Tree 64.00 25.44
Random Forrest 69.80 29.20
Gradient Boosting 71.79 33.48
Table 2: Gender prediction from user representations. First
column corresponds to the regular recommendation system,
and the following columns to privacy-adversarial training
with the prescribed value of λ. Rows correspond to the size
of user and item representations. Final row contains the
naı¨ve baseline reverting to the predicting the largest class.
size / λ 0 .01 .1 1 10
10 76.97 74.21 71.33 71.70 71.60
20 77.55 74.26 71.50 72.30 71.03
50 77.80 74.34 72.24 86.00 74.26
naı¨ve · · · 71.70% · · ·
k = 10). Private information in the user representa-
tions was evaluated using both a neural-net predictor
of the same form used during adversarial training, and
a host of standard classifiers (SVMs with various pa-
rameters and kernels, Decision Trees, Random Forest
– see Table 1). The rest of the results are shown for
the original neural classifier with a cross validation
procedure. Results are reported as accuracy.
Results-privacy Private demographic information
does indeed exist in user representations in the stan-
dard recommendation system. Gender prediction (Ta-
ble 2, λ = 0 column) increases with size of user rep-
resentation to 77.8% (recall 71.7% are Male). Like-
wise, age bracket prediction also increases with size
of user representation and reaches 44.90% (largest
category is 34.7%). These results serve as the base-
line against which the adversarial training models are
tested against. Our aim in the privacy-adversarial set-
ting will be to reduce the classification results down
to the baseline, reflecting user representations were
purged of this private information.
Results-privacy-adversarial In the privacy-
adversarial setting, overall prediction results for both
Table 3: Age prediction from user representations. First
column corresponds to the regular recommendation system,
and the following columns to privacy-adversarial training
with the prescribed value of λ. Rows correspond to the size
of user and item representations. Final row contains the
naı¨ve baseline reverting to the predicting the largest class.
size / λ 0 .01 .1 1 10
10 41.29 36.28 34.29 34.47 34.31
20 44.16 36.34 33.97 35.70 38.01
50 44.90 36.46 34.62 70.27 52.7
naı¨ve · · · 34.70% · · ·
gender and age are diminished to the desired level of
the largest class. With λ = .1, for example, age pre-
diction is eliminated completely (reducing effectively
to the 34.7% baseline) for all sizes of representation,
and likewise for gender with representation of size
10− 20. For size 50 we see some residual predictive
power, though it is highly reduced relative to the
regular recommendation system.
For the large representation (size 50) and large
values of λ in the range of λ ≥ 1 we see an interest-
ing phenomenon of reversal of the effect, with demo-
graphic readout sometimes way above the regular rec-
ommendation system (e.g when the embedding size =
50 and λ = 1 the gender prediction achieves 86.0%).
We suspect this happens due to the relative high learn-
ing rate, which causes the system to diverge.
With respect to the trade-off between system per-
formance and privacy, results indicate (Table. 4) that
smaller user representations (size 10) are preferen-
tial for this small dataset. We see some degradation
with adversarial training, but nevertheless we are able
to eliminate private information almost entirely with
representations of size 10 and λ = .1 while sacrific-
ing only a small proportion of performance (accu-
racy@10 of 2.88% instead of the 3.05% for the regu-
lar system, gender information gap of 0.37% and age
information gap of 0.41% from the majority group).
Together, these results show the existence of the
privacy leakage in a typical recommendation system,
Table 4: Recommendation System performance (accu-
racy@10) with privacy-adversarial training. First column
corresponds to the regular recommendation system, and the
following columns to privacy-adversarial training with the
prescribed value of λ. Rows correspond to the size of user
and item representations.
size / λ 0 .01 .1 1 10
10 3.05 2.76 2.88 2.43 2.67
20 3.00 2.68 2.04 2.20 2.07
50 2.65 2.38 2.22 2.22 2.15
and the ability to eliminate it with privacy-adversarial
training while harming the overall system perfor-
mance only marginally.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we discuss information leakage from
user representations of Latent factor recommender
systems, and show that private demographic informa-
tion can be read-out even when not used in the train-
ing data. We adapt the adversarial training frame-
work in the context of privacy in recommender sys-
tems. An adversarial component is appended to the
model for each of the demographic variables we want
to obfuscate, so that the learned user representations
are optimized in a way that precludes predicting these
variables. We show that the proposed framework has
the desired privacy preserving effect, while having a
minimal overall adverse effect on recommender per-
formance, when using the correct value of the trade-
off parameter λ. Our experiments show that this
value should be determined for a given dataset, since
values too large lead to instability of the adversar-
ial component. But in any case, as suggested by
(Elazar and Goldberg, 2018), when concerened with
sensitive features, one should verify the amount of in-
formation in the representation with additional post-
hoc classifier.
The adversarial method can be used to obfuscate
any private variable known during training (in this
paper we discuss categorical variables, but the gen-
eralization to the continuous case is trivial). While
at first glance this may be seen as a shortcoming of
the approach, it is interesting to note that it would be
inherently infeasible to force the representation not
to include any factor implicitly associated with item
choice. Clearly, in such a case there would be no
information left to drive recommendations. The in-
tended use of the method is rather to hide a small set
of protected variables known during training, while
using the rest of the implicit information in the usage
data to drive recommendations.
An interesting topic for further research is the
amount of private information that is available in the
top-k recommendations themselves. Since the sole
reason private demographic information is present in
the user representations is to help drive recommenda-
tions, it stands to reason that it would be possible to
design a method of reverse-engineering in the form
of a readout from the actual recommendations. Such
a leakage, to the extent that it indeed exists, would
have much further reaching practical implications for
privacy and security of individuals.
Another topic for further research is the use of
privacy-adversarial training to boost the personaliza-
tion and specificity of recommendations. By elimi-
nating the demographic (or other profile related) in-
formation, suggested items are coerced out of stereo-
typical templates related to coarse profiling. It is our
hope that user testing will confirm that this leads to
deeper and more meaningful user models, and overall
higher quality recommendations.
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